Intergenerational mobility of migrants: is there a gender gap? by Chen, Natalie et al.
 
 
 
Intergenerational Mobility of Migrants: 
Is There a Gender Gap? 
 
 
Natalie Chen, Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni 
  
No 815 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
Intergenerational Mobility of Migrants:
Is There a Gender Gap?∗†
Natalie Chen
University of Warwick and CEPR
Paola Conconi
Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES) and CEPR
Carlo Perroni
University of Warwick
This version: September 2007
Abstract
We examine gender differences in intergenerational patterns of social mobility for
second-generation migrants. Empirical studies of social mobility have found that
women are generally more mobile than men. Matching theory suggests that this
may be because the importance of market characteristics (financial wealth and
earning power) relative to non-market characteristics in the marriage market is
lesser for women than men, and market characteristics can be intergenerationally
more persistent than non-market characteristics. According to this interpretation,
the mobility gender gap should be wider for second-generation migrant house-
holds, where gender roles remain more pronounced than in the non-migrant
population. We explore this conjecture using data from the US General Social
Survey. Our results show that daughters of first-generation migrants are inter-
generationally more mobile than migrants’ sons, and more so than it is the case
for non-migrants’ children.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines patterns of intergenerational social mobility for US migrants,
with a specific focus on gender differentials.
Economic migrants choose to migrate to seek better economic opportunities not
just for themselves but also for their children. Since the most substantial flows of in-
ternational economic migration still are from lower income countries to higher income
countries, first-generation migrants are positioned, on average, at the lower end of the
income distribution in the host country.1 What this implies is that economic outcomes
for their offspring crucially depend on opportunities for vertical social mobility in the
host country. In other words, countries that offer opportunities for upward mobility
are comparatively more attractive to migrants even when opportunities for vertical
mobility can only be exploited by the second generation.
Intergenerational social mobility varies across countries; for example, the US have
been traditionally been viewed as being more mobile than European countries, al-
though recent evidence has shown the US to occupy a middle ground within OECD
countries—with countries such as Italy, France and the UK displaying less mobility
than the US, and countries such as Sweden, Canada and Norway exhibiting more
(Breen and Jonsson, 2004). Social mobility also tends to vary across different pop-
ulation groups within countries. For example, US patterns of intergenerational mo-
bility vary by race (Hertz, 2004). Our focus here, however, is not on race—an aspect
which has received considerable attention in the literature—but on intergenerational
patterns of mobility for the offspring of recent migrants, and specifically on gender
differentials in social mobility within that group.
When looking at the US population as a whole, there is a clear pattern of higher
mobility for women. Chadwick and Solon (2002) rationalize this pattern, in statis-
tical terms, as resulting from a combination of a higher share of husbands’ income
in total household income and by a less than perfect correlation between husbands’
1Borjas (2006) summarizes recent evidence on the social status and mobility of first-, second-, and
third-generation immigrants to the US. He estimates a wage disadvantage for first-generation migrants
equal to 19.7 percent.
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and wives’ parental incomes. In this paper we look to matching theory to provide
a theoretical foundation for these correlation patterns. In a multi-trait model of in-
heritance and matching, if the relative importance of market and non-market traits
in matching success is greater for women than it is for men, and if market traits are
more inheritable than non-market traits, women will be socially more mobile than
men across generations.
Our matching-theory based explanation is consistent Chadwick and Solon’s re-
duced-form specification, but it is able to yield a richer set of predictions. In particu-
lar, if comparative gender specialization in the marriage market is the reason for the
observed gender differential in mobility rates, we should expect the mobility gender
gap to be greater for those population groups in which gender roles are compara-
tively more specialized. This prediction is particularly relevant for migrants, who
tend to originate from countries where traditional gender roles within the household
are comparatively stronger. For example, in 2003, the labor force participation rate
for first-generation female immigrants of Mexican origin was 53.9 percent against 60.1
percent for non-hispanic white women (Angoa-Pe´rez, 2005). There is also evidence
that this cultural trait persists in second-generation migrants households: according
to the same source, the participation rate for second-generation females of Mexican
origin was 56.4 percent—still significantly below the non-immigrant average. Ac-
cording to the matching mechanism we describe, we should then expect that this
persistently greater importance of non-market traits for females in the immigrant
population should translate in a larger gender differential in vertical mobility for
migrants in comparison with non-migrants.
We examine the above conjecture by using information on couples from the US
General Social Survey, a dataset based on annual interviews which provides informa-
tion on the migrant status of respondents. We estimate intergenerational elasticities
of own household income for married respondents with respect to reported parental
income. We compare second-generation migrants with non-migrants, and, within
those groups, men and women.
Our results show that, in the population as a whole, women are more mobile
than men—a pattern that is also present when running similar estimates with the
2
Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset (also for the US). As expected, there is a
systematic upward income shift for second-generation migrants in comparison with
their parents. Daughters of migrants are more mobile than migrants’ sons, as is also
the case for children of non-migrants, but this mobility gender gap is indeed stronger
for migrants’ daughters and sons. Our analysis confirms the previously observed
gender asymmetries in patterns of intergenerational mobility, but shows that these
asymmetries are particularly pronounced for second-generation migrants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a theory
of intergenerational social mobility based on inheritance and multi-trait matching.
Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents our regression results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The “Cinderella Effect”
The empirical literature on social mobility has outlined differences in the patterns of
intergenerational mobility across genders. For example, various studies have found
the elasticity of a couple’s joint income with respect to the income of the wife’s par-
ents to be significantly lower than the corresponding elasticity with respect to the
husband’s parents (e.g. Chadwick and Solon, 2002).
Intergenerational mobility is the combined result of a large number of different
factors—such as schooling opportunities, labor market and marriage opportunities,
genetic transmission, luck. In this paper, we focus on the marriage as the specific
determinant of gender differentials in social mobility. The desirability of women in
the marriage market tends to be less determined by their market characteristics (fi-
nancial wealth and earning power) than it is the case for men.2 This difference can be
ascribed to biological differences in reproductive roles, to gender-based wage discrim-
2Recent research investigating speed dating (Fisman et al., 2006) and on-line dating (Hitsch et al.,
2006) examine the valuation of various attributes by men and women; in accordance with the common
stereotype, they find that females put greater weight on income and education relative to males, while
males put relatively greater weight on physical appearance.
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ination in the labor market, and, more generally, to the fact that traditional gender
roles persist within households. Institutional constraints, such as credit market im-
perfections that constrain human capital investment by lower income individuals, can
also imply that market characteristics exhibit a large degree of persistence. Then, if
non-market characteristics are intergenerationally less persistent than market charac-
teristics, women, whose marriage prospects depends more on the former, would tend
to display higher rates of social mobility than men—i.e. women are more likely to
marry up (and down).
This argument can be formalized in terms of a simple model of two-sided multi-
dimensional matching and inheritance—which we fully set out and analyze in a com-
panion paper (Chen et al., 2007). In what follows, we shall summarize the model’s
main features and predictions, keeping our discussion relatively informal.
Consider a population of two genders, males and females, with an equal number
of individuals of each gender, who can only match with one individual of the opposite
gender. Each individual possesses certain levels of two characteristics, x and y. In our
analysis, we think of y as a being a market-related characteristic and of x as a being
non market-related.
Social mobility in the model is the joint result of matching choices and of a process
of inheritance.3 Matching is modeled as follows. For each individual, the levels of
y and x are combined with gender-specific weights—which reflect the institutional
framework, e.g. gender-specific labor market opportunities—to determine an indi-
vidual’s attractiveness as a partner, with the relative weight on y (market character-
istic) assumed to be less for women than it is for men. The resulting attractiveness
index provides an objective ranking for each individual of each gender in terms of
her or his attractiveness to the other gender; a matching equilibrium will then feature
(perfectly) positive assortative matching in terms of gender-specific rank positions.
The inheritance process is modeled as follows. Each couple has two offsprings, a
3The seminal paper on matching and marriage is Becker (1973). The seminal paper on economic
inheritance and transmission is Becker and Tomes (1979). Goldberger (1989) offers a critical overview
of models of intergenerational transmission.
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daughter and a son. Inheritance of the two traits is assumed to be stochastic and to
be captured by exogenous transition probabilities. These are the same across genders,
but can differ across characteristics, reflecting both biological and institutional factors.
The probability for a child of either gender of experiencing a change in the level of a
trait relative to that of her or his parents is assumed to be greater for the non-market
trait than it is for the market trait.
Asymmetries in the patterns of intergenerational mobility can then result from dif-
ferences in the degree of persistence of market and non-market traits, combined with
differences in the relative importance of the two characteristics in determining the
match desirability of individuals of different genders. A “Cinderella effect” emerges,
whereby women are intergenerationally more mobile—they are more likely to “marry
up” (and “down”)—when the market-related characteristic is relatively more persis-
tent than the non-market-related characteristic (in a gender-neutral fashion) and is
relatively more important in determining male desirability (due to institutional fac-
tors).
More specifically, the model predicts that, when comparing a generation to the
next, women are more likely to experience a rank change than men. Note that this
construction involves both variables that are observable, such as household income,
and others that are not observable, such as non-market characteristics. Social rank,
which depends on both traits is thus also unobservable. Nevertheless, the model
also predicts that a positive correlation between traits within the population, which
implies that, even when focusing on observables—income rather than rank—women
will experience more mobility.
In more formal terms, let the attractiveness of a male, i, with characteristics xi, yi
be given by
zMi = w
M
x xi + w
M
y yi, (1)
and the attractiveness of a female, j, with characteristics xj, yj be given by
zFj = w
F
xxj + w
F
yyj, (2)
where
wMx + w
M
y = 1, w
F
x + w
F
y = 1, (3)
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and
wFx/w
F
y > w
M
x /w
M
y . (4)
Then, given a population of n males and n females, frictionless mating will result in
assortative matching according to zM and zF, i.e. the male with the highest zM will
match with the female with the highest zF, the male with the second highest zM will
match with the female with the second highest zF, and so on.
Suppose that each couple produces exactly one son and one daughter. Also, for
simplicity, suppose that the process of inheritance is gender-segregated in the sense
that daughters only inherit characteristics from their mothers and sons from their
fathers.4 The level of non-market trait for a son (daughter) whose father (mother) has
a level of non-market trait equal to x′ is
x′′ = x′ + ex, (5)
where e is a shock term with values {−s, 0, s} (s > 0). Denoting with x¯ the mean level
of the non-market trait, the probability of a positive shock (ex = s) is
pix =
{
pix i f x′ ≤ x
pix = βpix i f x′ > x
(6)
with 0 < β < 1, implying pix < pix. The reverse being the case for negative shocks,
i.e. the probability of a negative shock (ex = −s) is
pix =
{
pix i f x′ ≥ x
pix = βpix i f x′ < x
(7)
Moreover, for any given x′, we assume that pix + pix < 1. This guarantees that the
stochastic processes defined by (5) will be stationary.
The transmission of y is modeled in the same way, i.e.
y′′ = y′ + ey, (8)
4Chen, Conconi, Dura´n, and Perroni (2007) provide a generalization of the argument to the case
where inheritance is not gender-segregated in this way.
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with a transition probabilities piy rather than pix. Notice that the above formulation
implicitly assumes that the shocks ex and ey are uncorrelated. Also, the traits x and y
will be independently distributed in the population in the long run; and, if n is large,
the long-run distribution of traits (and desirability levels) in the population will be
invariant through time.
The above also implies that, in the long run, the two characteristics will each be
positively correlated with mating desirability—zM for males and zM for females—in
the population. Hence higher-y males will, on average, be matched with higher-y
females, which means that, for both males and females, mating desirability (and thus
social rank) will be positively correlated with household income and/or wealth, and
social mobility patterns will correlate with patterns of income mobility.
Suppose now that pix > piy—in other words, that the transition probability is lower
for the market trait than it is for the non-market trait (in a gender-neutral fashion).
Because of (4) this will result in women being intergenerationally more mobile than
men in terms of mating rank (and hence household income).
This result is best illustrated by means of an example. Let pix = 1/3, piy = 1/4,
β = 1/2, x¯ = y¯ = 0, s = 3, wMx = wFy = 1/3, wMy = wFx = 2/3. Also suppose that the
whole population is generated starting from individuals with x = y = 0. Consider
first a male with characteristics x′ = 0, y′ = 0, and attractiveness zM = 0. He will
produce a son with characteristics x′ = 1, y′ = 1 and attractiveness zM = 3 with
probability pixpiy = 1/12; will produce a son with characteristics x′ = 0, y′ = 1, and
attractiveness zM = 2, with probability (1− (1+ β)pix)piy = 1/8; and will produce
a son with characteristics x′ = 1, y′ = 0, and attractiveness zM = 1, with probability
pix(1− (1+ β)piy) = 5/24 > 1/8.
Consider next a mother with characteristics x′ = 0, y′ = 0. Notice that she will
produce a daughter with attractiveness zF = 3 with the same probability (1/12) com-
puted for the case of a father; however, she will produce a daughter with attractive-
ness zF = 2 with probability 5/24 (instead of 1/8) and a daughter of attractiveness
zF = 1 with probability 1/8 (instead of 5/24). In this example, zM and zF only assume
integer values, and therefore can be directly mapped into discrete social (matching)
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rank positions.5 So, in this example, a daughter is more likely to jump up by two
rank positions than she is to jump up by one rank position, while the opposite is true
for her brother.
The mechanism we describe above generates gender differences in mobility via the
matching process, even when the inheritance process itself is gender neutral. On the
other hand, if trait inheritance can be optimally differentiated by parents across sons
and daughters in order to account for differences in the relative importance of market
and non-market traits across genders, this can work to reinforce the gender gap.
For example, when accounting for the importance of earning power in determining
matching success, investment in education may produce a higher return for men than
it does for women. Then, a credit constrained family may optimally choose to invest
more in the education of a son than in that of a daughter; and to the extent that
education investment reduces relative income volatility, the market trait would be
more persistent for the son than it is for the daughter.
When applied to the case of migrants, this framework can yield a rich set of pre-
dictions. The persistence of more traditional gender roles in the second-generation
migrant group (leading to more female specialization in childcare and household
activities) can lead to a wider gap between wFx/wFy and wMx /wMy for migrants in com-
parison with to non-migrants. This would imply a stronger “Cinderella effect” for
female migrants, giving them a better chance to move up the ladder though the mar-
riage market (though they will also be more likely to move down). On the other
hand, if all second-generation migrants were to experience adverse discrimination in
the labor market in a gender neutral fashion (e.g., because they belong to a minority
ethnicity), the market trait would tend to be less important in determining outcomes
for both male and female second-generation migrants relative to the rest of the popu-
lation (in a gender neutral fashion). In this case, intergenerational patterns of mobility
5For an individual with traits x′, y′, and desirability z′ = zM = wMx x′ +wMy y′ (if male) or z′ = zF =
wFx x′ + wFyy′ (if female), the rank position can be more accurately expressed in terms of position on
the cumulative distribution F(z) of z = zM (if male) or z = zF (if female) in the population, i.e. as
r′ = F(z′). However, given that there is one-to-one mapping between z′ and r′, z′ can equivalently be
used to measure rank.
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could be less gender differentiated for migrants.
In the next sections, we shall test these theoretical predictions using data for US
migrants from the General Social Survey.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to estimate differences in intergenerational mobility across genders in the
US, we use two datasets, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS). The comparison of the results obtained using two different
datasets provides a good robustness check as to whether, as suggested by the theory,
women display a higher degree of social mobility relative to men. However, in order
to check for any difference in social mobility between genders and second-generation
migrants and non-migrants as well, we rely on the GSS only, as the PSID does not
allow us to distinguish between migrants and non-migrants. We next describe the
two datasets in turn.
3.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a very rich dataset, but unfortu-
nately it does not allow us to identify sub-groups of the population such as second-
generation migrants. We can nevertheless use this dataset to show that, when looking
at the whole population of married couples in the US, whatever their origin, women
are more socially mobile than men.
The PSID is a longitudinal survey conducted by the University of Michigan’s Sur-
vey Research Centre. The project started in 1968 and has conducted annual interviews
each year since then. The main advantage of the survey is that it has followed over
time children from the original families interviewed in 1968 as they have grown up
and formed their own households. As a result, it is possible to observe both the
household income of the kids once they have formed their own household, as well
as the income of their parents when the respondents were young children, and as
reported by the parents themselves. For both children and their parents, household
9
income is defined as the sum of labor income of both spouses (all deflated by the US
consumer price index).
The sample we consider in the analysis is computed as in Chadwick and Solon
(2002). It consists of respondents who were kids in the original 1968 sample and also
participated in the 1992 survey as adults. In the 1992 survey, their income refers to
their income in 1991. We restrict the sample to respondents born between 1951 and
1966. Children born before 1951, who were older than seventeen years of age at the
1968 interview, are excluded to avoid over-representing children who left home at
late ages. In addition, restricting the sample to children born before 1967 enables
to ensure that the children’s 1991 income measures are observed at ages of at least
twenty-five years (otherwise at younger ages income measures might not be good
proxies of long-run income status).
As in Chadwick and Solon (2002), we try to eliminate measurement error in
parental long run income by averaging (real) parental income over several years. We
use family income for the years 1967-1971 (as reported in the 1968-1972 interviews)
for the 1968 household head. Non-working spouses are included in the sample. The
resulting sample includes 1,356 observations, of which 642 are daughters and 716 are
sons.
3.2 General Social Survey
The General Social Survey (GSS) is an almost6 annual personal interview survey of
US households conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC). Each
survey is an independently drawn sample of English-speaking persons eighteen years
of age or over, living in non-institutional arrangements within the US. The first survey
took place in 1972 and since then more than 38,000 respondents have answered over
3,260 questions. All twenty-five surveys are available merged in a single file, allowing
to exploit the information from the pooled sample of respondents over years. Note
the dataset is not a panel in the sense that different respondents are interviewed in
6Since the first year of the survey in 1972, the interviews have been conducted every year until 2004
(the most recent available data) except in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.
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each year.
The survey covers a broad range of questions, which come under three categories:
permanent questions that occur in each survey, rotating questions that appear in two
out of every three surveys, and a few occasional questions. The dataset reports yearly
information on the household income of married spouses (adjusted for inflation), as
well as information on parental income when the respondent was sixteen years of
age. In contrast to the PSID, in which parental income is actually observed (and is
reported by the parents themselves), in the GSS parental income is reported by the
children and is only available as a ranked variable. It is the answer to the question
“Thinking about the time when you were sixteen years old, compared with American
families in general then, would you say your family income was far below average,
below average, average, above average, or far above average?”Possible answers range
from 1 (“far below average”) to 5 (“far above average”). Measures of the occupational
prestige of the respondent, his/her spouse, father and mother are also available.
Most importantly for our purposes, the GSS allows us to identify second-generation
migrants in the US. In particular, it provides information on the place of birth of the
respondent, that of the parents, as well as his/her ethnicity and that of the spouse.
We define second-generation migrant couples as respondents who were born in the
US, whose parents were both born outside the US,7 and whose ethnicity, as well as
that of the spouse, is not “American”.8 Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide
any information on the place of birth of the spouse nor of her/his parents. US nation-
als are defined as being born in the US, with both parents and all four grandparents
as well. We focus on married couples only, but do not restrict the sample according
to the working status of either spouse. The resulting sample includes 7,717 observa-
tions, of which 3,924 are daughters (289 are migrant and 3,635 are non-migrant) and
3,793 are sons (332 are migrant and 3,461 are non-migrant).
7We tried to further restrict the sample to those respondents with four grandparents born outside
the US, but this does not change much the sample size nor the results.
8One of the possible responses to the ethnicity question in the survey is “American”, which we take
as indicating self-identification with the not recently immigrated population.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the reported household income (in real
terms) of married respondents across genders in the PSID. The first row of the Table
shows that on average, married women significantly report a lower household in-
come as compared to men. With random sampling, one should expect married men
and married women to report the same household income (or, at least, the difference
between the two reported incomes should not be significant from a statistical point
of view). We therefore conclude that the data suffer from a gender bias in the way
household income is reported.9
[Table 1 here]
We attempt to eliminate this gender bias by computing gender specific income
ranks for the children. Focusing on the sample of married couples aged between 25
and 39, we calculate separately for each gender the 25th, 45th, 55th and 75th centiles
of reported household income, which we then use to compute an income rank taking
values between 1 and 5, with a lower value indicating a lower household income.10
By doing this separately for each gender, we hope to eliminate the bias in reported
income we observe in the data, and which might potentially affect our empirical
results.
The second row in Table 1 reports the mean gender-specific household income
ranks so obtained. Importantly, the difference between genders is now insignificantly
different from zero.11 We repeat the same exercise for parental income to control for
9Surprisingly, this bias has not been noted by Chadwick and Solon (2002), who use the PSID to
investigate the patterns of intergenerational mobility across genders. However, previous studies have
found evidence of larger measurement errors in earnings reports for men than for women. See, for
example, Greenberg and Halsey (1983), Bound and Krueger (1991) and Bollinger (1998).
10We decided to compute an income rank measure taking five different values for consistency with
what we do later when using the GSS.
11The fact that income ranks are not exactly identical between genders arises from clustering at
various threshold levels due to the fact that reported incomes levels are rounded to the closest $1,000.
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any gender bias there may be as well in the way household income is reported by the
parents. The third line of Table 1 indeed shows that there is no significant difference
in parental income ranks across genders once the data are re-normalized. As we will
show in the next section, women significantly display a higher social mobility relative
to men both in terms of the original measure of household income and in terms of
the rank measure.
We repeat the same exercise using the GSS. The first row of Table 2 compares
reported household income of married couples across genders. As was the case in
the PSID, the bias is again present, i.e. women significantly under-report household
income as compared to men. We therefore re-scale household income separately for
each gender to arrive at a gender-specific measure of income rank that takes on values
between 1 and 5. This allows us to compare household income of the children with
parental income, which is only available in the GSS as a ranked variable that varies
between 1 and 5.
[Table 2 here]
Since in the GSS both household and parental incomes are reported by the chil-
dren, a bias in reported household income might also be present in the parental
income reported by the children. Therefore, in contrast to what we did with the
PSID, the centiles we now use for re-scaling household income are chosen in order
to match the distribution of parental incomes as reported by the children. Focusing
on the sample of married women, if, for instance, seven percent of them report that
their parents’ income was far below average when they were sixteen years of age (i.e.
parental income is given a value of 1), we then use this seven percentile and apply
it to the distribution of current household income for married women to identify an
income rank of 1 (i.e. a value of 1 is assigned to the seven percent poorer married
women in the sample). We repeat the same procedure for the other values of parental
income from 2 to 5, and then, separately, for married men.
The second row of Table 2 reports the gender-specific income ranks so obtained.
As in the PSID case, such re-scaling enables us to adjust for systematic gender differ-
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ence in reported household income. In the empirical analysis that follows we will use
the rank measure for household income instead of the original variable.
Table 3 reports, for both genders and for second-generation migrants and non-
migrants, parental income and our re-scaled measure for household income. The
third row of the Table reports the intergenerational shift for each sub-group of the
population, as well as its significance level. It can be seen that all sub-groups of
the population have experienced an upward shift in social status relative to their
parents, all shifts being statistically different from zero. Most importantly, column
(7) shows that second-generation married migrants have, on average, experienced a
stronger upward shift relative to non-migrants (the difference is significant at the ten
percent level). This illustrates that the opportunities offered to second-generation
migrants in the US allow them to significantly improve their social status relative to
their parents.12 This difference does not appear to be significant across genders, so
more formal regression analysis is required to examine gender differences.
[Table 3 here]
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for married individuals in the GSS, distin-
guishing between second-generation migrants and non-migrants, as well as between
genders. In our sample, migrants are on average older than non-migrants, they were
older when they first got married and are less educated. Men, whether migrant or
non-migrant, tend to work longer hours per week than their wives.
There is also some evidence of more female specialization in household activities
for migrants. Migrant women are less likely to work in a full-time job than their
husbands, who are themselves less likely to do so as compared to non-migrant men.
12Borjas (2006) notes that second-generation migrants experience a significant improvement relative
to their parents, although the “catch up” to native-born workers is slow. This represents a significant
change in comparison with patterns observed for the mid 1900s, whereby second-generation migrants
were actually outperforming both their parents and their children. On this point, see also Perlmann
and Waldinger (1997).
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Migrant women spend more time at keeping the house, as forty-nine percent of them
report as staying home against thirty-seven percent for non-migrant women.13
[Table 4 here]
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics at the level of households. Migrants have on
average larger households, but a smaller number of children living with them, at
all ages. This is probably because the second-generation migrants observed in our
dataset are on average much older than non-migrants.
[Table 5 here]
4 Empirical Analysis
To estimate the extent of intergenerational social mobility, we regress the household
income of married spouses on the income of the parents when the respondent was a
child (ordered probit for income rank values of 1 to 5). Table 6 reports the results
using the PSID, which only allows us to check for differences in mobility across
genders. The first specification we estimate is similar to Chadwick and Solon (2002),
and can be expressed as
ln y1,91 = α+ β1 ln y0,68+ β2age1,91+ β3 (age1,91)
2+ β4age0,68+ β5
(
age0,68
)2
+ e1,91 (9)
where the index 1 denotes the generation of the kids and the index 0 indicates the
generation of the parents; ln y1,91 is the log (real) household income of the children
in 1991 (observed in the 1992 survey, and is the sum of both spouses’ labor incomes)
who are married and aged between twenty-five and thirty-nine; ln y0,68 is the average
13It would be interesting to observe the magnitude of the gender gap in earnings across genders, but
unfortunately the dataset does not provide any information on the individual income of the spouse.
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of the log (real) household income of the parents (sum of the labor incomes of the
two spouses) between 1967-1969, i.e. when the kids were still living with their parents
(and were aged between two and seventeen in 1968); age1,91 is the age of the respon-
dent in 1991 and age0,68 is the average age of the father (assumed to be the head of the
household) between 1967-1969. To investigate for differences in social mobility across
genders, we then interact the parental status variable y0,68 with a female dummy,
denoted by Fem.
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the results using the original data on household
and parental incomes, and shows that for husbands, the estimated elasticity is sig-
nificant and equal to 0.44, which is very similar to that reported in previous studies
(Chadwick and Solon, 2002). The interaction between parental income and the fe-
male dummy is negative and highly significant, suggesting that on average, married
women are more mobile than men, a result consistent the findings of earlier studies.
[Table 6 here]
We then compare those results to those obtained when using the gender-specific
income ranks we have calculated, as explained in the previous section. The specifica-
tion now becomes
y˜1,91 = α+ β1y˜0,68+ β2age1,91+ β3 (age1,91)
2+ β4age0,68+ β5
(
age0,68
)2
+ e˜1,91 (10)
where y˜1,91 and y˜0,68 denote the gender-specific household income ranks for respon-
dents and their parents respectively, which both vary between 1 and 5. As can be
seen from column (2) in Table 6, which reports the results of the estimation, the same
pattern emerges as in column (1): women are on average more mobile than men. This
is reassuring as it indicates that our re-scaling of the data to eliminate any gender bias
in reported income does not affect the main results. We can therefore follow the same
approach when using the GSS.
We now turn to the results obtained with the GSS. We regress the gender-specific
income ranks of married couples on the income status of the parents when the kids
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were 16 years of age (which is only available as a rank and so is not re-scaled).
Controls are age and age squared,14 as well as year fixed effects. The specification is
y˜1,t = αt + β1y0,t + β2age1,t + β3 (age1,t)
2 + ε1,t (11)
where t indicates the survey year 1972-2004, y˜1,t is the gender specific income rank of
the children (which generation is again indexed by 1), y0,t is the income status of the
parents (generation indexed by 0) when the kids were 16 years of age, age1,t is the age
of the child, αt are year fixed effects and the sample includes married individuals only.
We again interact the parental status variable y0,t with a female dummy to explore
whether mobility differs across genders. To check whether mobility differs between
migrants and non-migrants, we further interact the two variables with dummies for
being a second-generation migrant or a non-migrant, respectively denoted by Mig
and US.
Column (1) of Table 7 reports results for the basic specification (ordered probit
for income rank values of 1 to 5). The estimated intergenerational elasticity is signif-
icant and equal to 0.227.15 In column (2), we interact parental income with a female
dummy, and consistent with the findings obtained with the PSID, and with previ-
ous literature, the interaction is negative and significant, suggesting that women are
generally more mobile socially than men. Note that the sample includes married
second-generation migrants and non-migrant couples only, the excluded population
consisting of all the others such as first generation migrants, or US nationals with at
least a parent not born in the US.
[Table 7 here]
Column (3) interacts parental income with dummies capturing the origin of the
couples, i.e. capturing whether they are migrant or non-migrant. Both elasticities are
14The age of the parents or of the father when the respondent was a child is usually also included
as a control, as we did in the regressions using the PSID. Unfortunately, the GSS does not provide
information on the age of the parents, so we are unable to control for this in our regressions.
15The magnitude of this elasticity is smaller than that found in the literature, and to that obtained
when we use the PSID.
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positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient for second-generation
migrants is larger than that for non-migrants, and we can reject that the two elastic-
ities are equal at the 1 percent level (as shown in Table 8). Note that those estimates
allow us to say nothing about the direction (upward or downward) or about the size
of the jumps in social status. And indeed, we should take this finding as an indication
of lower dispersion in social rank changes for migrants: as previously shown in Table
3, on average second-generation migrants experience an upward shift in income rank
relative to non-migrants (with a statistically significant gap of 0.08), and so the higher
elasticity coefficient for them is partly due to a systematic upward mobility bias for
migrants, rather than reflecting lower mobility.
[Table 8 here]
In column (4) we further interact parental income for migrants and non-migrants
with a female dummy. We do find evidence of a “Cinderella effect” as married
women, whether second-generation migrant or not, are significantly more mobile rel-
ative to men. Changes in social status for married women thus appear to be less
dependent on market-related characteristics than is the case for men. However, mi-
grant women are significantly more persistent than non-migrant women, as we can
reject (at the 1 percent level) that the two elasticities are the same. The gap between
migrant women and their husbands is also significantly larger than between non-
migrant spouses.
Finally, we investigate whether mobility is affected by the type of marriage of the
spouses, and in particular by whether second-generation migrants marry inside or
outside their ethnic group. We compute two dummies equal to one when the spouse
belongs or not to the same ethnic group as the respondent, respectively denoted by
Same and Mix, and interact them with parental income and parental income inter-
acted with the female dummy for migrants. The results are reported in Column (5).
It is worth noting that women who marry outside their ethnic group are those who
display the strongest mobility (smaller persistence) in social status.
18
Summary and Conclusion
Empirical studies of social mobility have found that women are generally more mo-
bile than men. In this paper we provide a matching-theory based interpretation of this
pattern, and conjecture that this may be due to market characteristics being more in-
tergenerationally persistent than non-market characteristics, and to non-market char-
acteristics being comparatively more important for women than for men in deter-
mining social status (and hence household income). When applied to the case of
second-generation migrants, for whom intra-household specialization is still more
marked than it is for the rest of the population, this would lead to the prediction that
the gender mobility gap should be more pronounced for second-generation migrants
than for non-migrants.
We have explored this conjecture using data from the US General Social Survey.
Our results suggest that daughters of migrants are intergenerationally more mobile
than migrants’ sons, and indeed more so than it is the case for non-migrants’ daugh-
ters.16
There is, in other words, a gender gap in the American dream for migrants, with
daughters of second-generation migrants finding it easier to move up the social lad-
der. Paradoxically, this female advantage in social mobility arises because of the ad-
verse discrimination experienced by second-generation migrant women in the labor
market and within their households.
16Further analysis is required to uncover more detailed differences in patterns of social mobility (e.g.
estimation of quantile transition matrices); we plan to pursue this in future research.
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Table 1: Household and Parental Income (Married Couples Aged 25-39) – PSID
Women Men Women - Men
Reported Real Household Income (USD) (y1,91) 8,734.5 12,217.6 −3, 483
(614.9)
a
Gender Specific Household Income Rank [1-5] (y˜1,91) 3.01 3.15 −0.133
(0.095)
Gender Specific Parental Income Rank [1-5] (y˜0,68) 3.42 3.39 0.021
(0.088)
Notes: a denotes significance at 1 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Observations are weighted using sampling weights.
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Table 2: Household Income (Married Couples) – GSS
Women Men Women - Men
Reported Real Household Income (USD) (y1,t) 61,453 64,218 −2, 765
(949.6)
a
Gender Specific Household Income Rank [1-5] (y˜1,t) 2.71 2.73 −0.02
(0.01)
Notes: a denotes significance at 1 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Households in the Sample (Married Couples) – GSS
Migrants US Migrants - US
Number of adults in household 2.25 2.17 0.08
(0.02)
a
Number of kids less than 6 years old 0.10 0.37 −0.26
(0.02)
a
Number of kids 6-12 years old 0.19 0.42 −0.23
(0.02)
a
Number of kids 13-17 years old 0.19 0.27 −0.08
(0.02)
a
Notes: a denotes significance at 1 percent level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Intergenerational Mobility – PSID
(1) (2)
Dependent variable ln y1,91 y˜1,91
ln y0,68 0.440
(0.048)
a –
ln y0,68 × Fem −0.063
(0.006)
a –
y˜0,68 – 0.221
(0.024)
a
y˜0,68 × Fem – −0.040
(0.019)
b
age1,91 0.044
(0.122)
0.044
(0.135)
(age1,91)
2 0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
age0,68 0.026(0.028)
0.009
(0.034)(
age0,68
)2
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
N 1358 1358
R2 0.156 –
Notes: Observations are weighted using sampling weights. Ordered Probit
regression in (2).
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Table 7: Intergenerational Mobility – GSS
Dependent: Gender Specific Household Income Rank y˜1,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
y0,t 0.227
(0.008)
a 0.240
(0.010)
a – – –
y0,t × Fem – −0.025
(0.007)
a – – –
y0,t ×US – – 0.224
(0.007)
a 0.234
(0.009)
a 0.145
(0.021)
a
y0,t ×US× Fem – – – −0.022
(0.006)
a −0.022
(0.006)
a
y0,t ×Mig – – 0.283
(0.012)
a 0.311
(0.012)
a –
y0,t ×Mig× Fem – – – −0.059
(0.012)
a –
y0,t ×Mig× Same – – – – 0.192
(0.013)
a
y0,t ×Mig× Same× Fem – – – – 0.079
(0.025)
a
y0,t ×Mig×Mix – – – – 0.270
(0.044)
a
y0,t ×Mig×Mix× Fem – – – – −0.179
(0.014)
a
age1,t 0.150
(0.003)
a 0.150
(0.003)
a 0.150
(0.003)
a 0.150
(0.003)
a 0.148
(0.003)
a
(age1,t)
2 −0.002
(0.000)
a −0.002
(0.000)
a −0.002
(0.000)
a −0.002
(0.000)
a −0.002
(0.000)
a
N 7717 7717 7717 7717 7719
Notes: Year fixed effects are included. Ordered Probit regressions.
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Table 8: Intergenerational Mobility – GSS
Implied Elasticities and Tests of Equality of Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[y0,t ×US] = [y0,t ×Mig] – – (1) 0.01 – –
[y0,t ×US] + [y0,t ×US× Fem] – – – (2) 0.212
(0.01)
(2) 0.124
(0.02)
[y0,t ×Mig] + [y0,t ×Mig× Fem] – – – (2) 0.251
(0.01)
–
[y0,t ×US] + [y0,t ×US× Fem] = [y0,t ×Mig] + [y0,t ×Mig× Fem] – – – (1) 0.01 –
[y0,t ×US× Fem] = [y0,t ×Mig× Fem] – – – (1) 0.00 –
[y0,t ×Mig× Same] + [y0,t ×Mig× Same× Fem] – – – – (2) 0.271
(0.02)
[y0,t ×Mig×Mix] + [y0,t ×Mig×Mix× Fem] – – – – (2) 0.091
(0.04)
[y0,t ×US× Fem] = [y0,t ×Mig× Same× Fem] – – – – (1) 0.00
[y0,t ×US× Fem] = [y0,t ×Mig×Mix] – – – – (1) 0.00
[y0,t ×Mig× Same× Fem] = [y0,t ×Mig×Mix× Fem] – – – – (1) 0.00
Notes: (1) indicates a p-value; (2) indicates an estimated elasticity.
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